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The death of Toronto physician and psychotherapist Suzanne Killinger-
Johnson in August 2000, days after she jumped - in the throes of a severe
postpartum depression and clutching her six-month-old son - in front of a
subway train, removed the vexed question of whether she was to be
charged with murder in the boy's death. Breathing a collective sigh of
relief, local authorities and newspaper editorialists alike would not be
forced to wrestle with the range of menacing questions - legal, medical,
psychiatric, political - that arose from the event. Rather, what had been a
homicide investigation quickly became a coroner's inquiry, with the
burden of censure displaced by, and finally recuperated in, a chorus of
"why?" The inexplicability of the event seemed to turn on the unlikelihood
of Killinger-Johnson as a candidate for such a tragedy. Repeatedly referring
to the fact that she came from a "family of prominent professionals," and
enjoyed a "life of affluence and success in one of the city's more fashionable
neighbourhoods" with her husband and their new son, editorialists
scratched their heads and turned, expectantly, to the medical "experts,"
who proved to be equally baffled.
The rhetoric of anomaly prevailed in the media response to the event and
its aftermath.1 The Globe and Mail's Michael Valpy reported that
It is among the rarest of acts known to criminologists and medical
psychopathologists: a woman who with her infant son in her arms
leaps to almost certain death. What happened to Suzanne Killinger-
Johnson and her six-month-old son in a Toronto subway station
yesterday morning is so atypical that the clinical medical literature on
major postpartum depression - the most common complication of
childbirth - doesn't allude to it. The literature says a mother suffering
from the condition may be at risk of harming herself, or that an infant
may be at risk of being harmed by its mother. But not both. (AI)
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The infanticide-suicide was thus doubly unlikely: not only do most
mothers not kill themselves and their infants, but women like her are not
supposed to do this. Poor, single mothers, homeless mothers, and abused
mothers come to mind, not mothers with promising careers, expensive
cars, and mortgage-free homes, mothers who so perfectly realize neo-
liberalism's fantasy of unfettered "freedom."
If the language of rights and freedoms has become virtually synonymous
with the realm of the political, the older language of duty, obligation, and
responsibility that it displaced is what we generally associate with an
ethical sphere. In feminist theory, Luce Irigaray is one of the foremost
theorists of an ethics that must, she argues, take as its foundation sexual
difference. "Replacing the one by the two of sexual difference," she
suggests, in "The Question of the Other,"
thus constitutes a decisive philosophical and political gesture, one
which gives up a singular or plural being [l'etre un ou pluriell in order to
become a dual being [l'etre deux]. This is the necessary foundation for a
new ontology, a new ethics, and a new politics, in which the other is
recognized as other and not as the same: bigger or smaller than I, or at
best, my equal. (19)
To those who would protest, and many have, that Irigaray in effect
universalizes the heterosexual relation as the model for all relations of
alterity or difference, others, such as Elizabeth Grosz, would respond with
the following question: "what would other relations of sexuality be like if
and when there was a recognition of the existence of more than one sex?
[... ] What changes would there be to homosexuality, to love between
women, between men, to sexual love of all kinds, if this recognition were
possible?" (28). Irigaray's ethics of sexual difference is, thus, an impossible
ethics, in that the conditions of its possibility exist in nature - "Sexual
difference is an immediate natural given" - but the realization of those
conditions have yet to make their way into culture, into the legal and
political structures that govern our lives (ILTY 47). In Sexes and Genealogies,
Irigaray offers a concrete proposal with her suggestion that "what is
needed is a full-scale rethinking of the law's duty to offer justice to two
genders that differ in their needs, their desires, their properties...If the
rights of the couple were indeed written into the legal code, this would
serve to convert individual morality into collective ethics" (5).
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The "individual morality" to which Irigaray refers is an effect of this
violent logic of the one, as opposed to the being-two that founds her
impossible ethics. This logic of sameness is that which grounds the
patriarchal family, that mainstay of modern liberal democracies (not to
mention the version of sameness - equality before the law - that grounds
liberalism). Because we have, as yet, no socio-cultural, legal or political
recognition that there exists more than one sex, within the context of the
private family, Irigaray suggests, "The woman is wife and mother."
But for her, this role is a function of an abstract duty. So she is not this
woman, irreducible in her singularity, wife of this man, who is himself
also irreducible, any more than she is this mother of this child or these
children.. .In other words, a woman's love is defined as familial and
civil duty. She has no right to singular love nor to love for herself. She is
thus unable to love but is to be subjugated to love and reproduction.
She has to be sacrificed and to sacrifice herself to this task, at the same
time disappearing as this or that woman who is alive at the present
time. And she must disappear as desire too, unless it is abstract: the
desire to be wife and mother. This self-effacement in a family-related
role is her civil task. ([LrY 21)
This particular kind of mother-love has long been exploited for the way in
which it naturalizes the mother-child relationship, and ordains it as the
exemplary ethical relationship, so that a mother's duty and obligation to
her child (and family) precedes any contractual claim to political rights or
freedoms. For Irigaray, this model of the mother-child relationship is not
ethical precisely because it is premised on patriarchal relations of the
reproduction of sameness, and thus constitutes an ethics of the one, not the
two. In this context it is the mother's duty that prevents her from acceding
to the kind of rights-bearing status associated with the political sphere. In
Irigaray's formulation of an ethics of sexual difference, however, the realm
of the political is the precondition for an opening onto the ethical. Until the
sexual difference of being-two is inscribed in law, there is no possibility of
the ethics that Irigaray describes. An ethics of sexual difference, for
Irigaray, would thus proceed from the political, not towards it.
The centuries-old figure of the duty-bound mother as moral exemplar
has been deployed perhaps most strategically - put to work as it were - in
the service of what Foucault would call the "conduct of conduct," or
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governmentality, understood as the paradigmatic exercise of power in
liberal democratic states. Following Foucault, Nikolas Rose has
emphasized that since liberal democracies limit the power of government
to intervene in the lives of individual citizens, what he calls "technologies
of subjectivity" - a prime example of which is psychotherapy, along with
its popularization in contemporary recovery movements - have come to
act in the place of more direct apparatuses of government. For Rose,
freedom is by no means opposed to government or regulation, but rather is
the very principle of governance. The Killinger-Johnson example is a case
in point. "The night before she jumped," wrote Margaret Wente in The
Globe and Mail,
the young doctor [Killinger-Johnson] was apprehended at a subway
station with her baby son, Cuyler, in her arms. She gave a false name.
Intercepted again at another station, she allowed the police to take her
quietly home to her husband. She convinced them all she was not out
of control, not crazy, not psychotic. Less than seven hours later, she
strapped her infant into the baby seat of her silver Mercedes SUV. She
drove to a parking lot she knew was across the street from a subway
entrance. She ignored a security guard who said it was too early to
park there. She took the baby out of his seat, and smiled politely at
someone handing out free newspapers. She walked into the station,
straight through the crowd of early morning commuters, and jumped
in front of the first northbound train that came along. (AI)
In Wente's narrative, Killinger-Johnson's actions were the result of rational
- even cold - and free calculation, and careful, meticulous strategy.
Killinger-Johnson eluded the full force of law, of discipline, because,
according to Wente, she possessed a kind of expertise in conduct that
allowed her to convince those who wished to take her into custody that she
was "not out of control, not crazy, not psychotic." Because she was able to
perform certain norms of conduct, she was delivered into the "safety" of
her family, without question, away from the prying and prodding of social
workers and psychologists. In the aftermath of Killinger-Johnson's death,
Maclean's magazine ran a story on depression amongst physicians, and
cited a psychiatrist who - treating only physicians in his practice -
suggested that "when a physician is depressed, he or she suffers an even
greater degree of guilt, shame, failure and the isolation that goes with that."
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Pointing to a higher rate of suicide amongst medical professionals, along
with the tendency for physicians to self-diagnose rather than visit a
professional themselves, the article concludes by citing the various
"physician self-awareness programs" that have sprung up in medical
schools across the country, which aim to dispel the "myth of
invulnerability" that surrounds the profession, and train medical students
to "ask for help" and make "self-care" a "core value in medical school"
(39). Killinger-Johnson, a psychotherapist and physician in a family of
psychotherapists and physicians, whose job it was to treat other
professionals, was undoubtedly familiar with the therapeutic turn in
medical schools. Whatever happened to Killinger-Johnson, it wasn't from
any lack of intimacy with techniques of government.
The tragedy, for Wente, is that Killinger-Johnson "behaved perfectly
normally." She continues, "But that's what highly competent people do.
They are on their best behaviour, even as their inner worlds collapse.. .It
sometimes seems to me that the more able and gifted the sufferers, the
more insidious is the course of this disease. People such as Suzanne
Killinger-Johnson hold themselves to the highest standards. They expect
themselves to manage through it." Killinger-Johnson's ability to appear
"normal" enabled the tragedy because, according to Wente, it allowed her
to escape the interventions and ministrations of either the authorities or her
family. Moreover, the failure of government happened at the moment at
which Killinger-Johnson, precisely because she ''behaved perfectly
normally," managed to get away, and had nobody attending her.
Rehearsing Killinger-Johnson's actions, Wente deploys the rhetoric of
appearance in order to accentuate that the tragedy turned on an inability
by those who were in charge - the authorities, her family - to penetrate the
woman's act. Government failed, according to this logic, to truly know the
governed. One might argue, however, quite to the contrary, that the
tragedy in this case was not one of too little or insufficient government, but
too much. The very capacity to reiterate norms of conduct is an effect of
government, a sign of its intimate presence, not its absence. Indeed, the
much-vexed irrationality of Killinger-Johnson's death derives in large part
from her doubly exemplary status: she is at once the paradigm of the
governmental technocrat and the duty-bound mother. Her death is
incomprehensible to commentators not merely because she managed to
escape the ministrations of both government and family, but precisely
because she embodies the fundamental principles of those institutions and
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the moral order that supports them.
Implicit in the chorus of "why?" that followed Killinger-Johnson's death
was the question: "how could this happen to someone like her, someone so
normal?" Generally not asked when someone unlike Killinger-Johnson
dies - the homeless, poor, single mother, for instance - the question, in its
attempt to make sense of her death, inadvertently reinscribed the very
norms it might otherwise have interrogated. Cases unlike Killinger-
Johnson's derive their explanatory power by locating the necessarily
pathologized mother/victim outside the ethical and social norm. Thus,
unable to arrive at an even remotely satisfying motivation or cause, one
which those cases unlike Killinger-Johnson's can supply, the media
discourse about Killinger-Johnson registered a kind of limit or crisis of
knowledge. In the absence of a compelling material reason for the
infanticide-suicide (the post-partum depression, though perfectly
material, was necessarily too mystified in the media coverage to serve this
particular purpose), a spectre arose that generally doesn't haunt cases
unlike Killinger-Johnson's. In posing the question "why?" the media
opened up the possibility of a line of question that, though not pursued,
made its presence felt. The question "why?" remarks the limit of what it is
possible to ask within the terms of our ethical order. If the figure of the
mother-child relationship constitutes the ethical ground of the patriarchal
family, and by extension society, then as ground it also constitutes a kind of
limit, one which can never be approached. The mother-child relationship
is, thus, the occluded origin from which our ethical norms are generated.
This is, of course, what Irigaray calls the logic of sacrifice, and that which
she calls into question with her critique of the ethics of the one, those
ethical norms the paucity of which the Killinger-Johnson case lays bare.
Because Killinger-Johnson doubly embodies the fundamental principles of
the hegemonic ethical paradigm, the Widespread media appeal to the
unanswerable or impossible question simply underlined an unwillingness
to interrogate the foundation of that question in those ethics. A feminist
ethics might begin by attempting to approach the limit which the Killinger-
Johnson case exposes. This issue of Tessera is oriented in that direction and
to that task.
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Notes
Thanks to Lauren Gillingham and Craig Gordon for their comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft.
1 This insistence on the exceptionality of the event raises the spectre of the
media response to the 1989 Montreal Massacre, in which, as many
feminists remarked, an undue focus on the singularity of both the act and
its perpetrator deflected attention from its wider social and political
implications and determinations.
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